Stages in Corporate Stability and the Risks of Corporate Failure
FEW would deny that the U.S. economy is today dominated by huge corporations. Much recent writing has proposed that these corporations form a stable and monopolistic (or oligopolistic) "core" around which a more competitive "peripheral" sector exists. Firms in the core are said to be "eternal," while firms in the periphery demonstrate the mortality and high turnover expected in competitive industries.1 In another context, Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy emphasized the permanence of big corporations when they noted:
The real capitalist today is not the individual businessman but the corporation. .. . The giant corporation of today is an engine for maximizing profits and accumulating capital to at least as great an extent as the individual enterprise of an earlier period. But it is not merely an enlarged and institutionalized version of the personal capitalist. There are major differences between these types of business enterprise, and at least two of them are of key importance to a general theory of monopoly capitalism: the corporation has a longer time horizon than the individual capitalist, and it is a more rational calculator.2
From an historical perspective, however, it appears to be an open question whether big corporations are long-lived or whether they tend to be "paper tigers" of glorious but relatively short longevity. According to his list, forty-two of the top one hundred firms (by assets) in 1917 continued to be large enough to rank in the top one hundred (by sales) on Fortune's 1967 list. Kaplan and Forbes concluded that turnover was "high," while Collins and Preston and Friedland decided that size was indeed related to "stability," although clearly the evidence used is quite similar. Navin contented himself with a careful presentation of the evidence, adding only the astute observation that turnover between 1917 and 1967 among the largest forty firms seemed substantially less than among the remaining four hundred and sixty.
These studies provide the basis for a consensus on the turnover issue. Apparently of the top one hundred firms in the opening decades of the century, roughly thirty to forty-five would appear on the list fifty years later. Whether or not that figure is large seems to deSee "Large Industrial Corporations and Asset Shares: Reply," American Economic Review (March 1971). Nevertheless, for studies of concentration per se, industry studies would appear to be more appropriate. The focus here is directly on corporate power, for which the largest corporations are precisely the correct "statistical universe," though of course there is nothing magical about any particular cutoff point (e.g., the top 100). pend on one's inclinations, but it does not provide much basis for viewing the big corporation as an "eternal life" institution.
The issue of corporate power and longevity is not quite so simple, however. The work as it now stands can be faulted on several counts.4 First, the focus on gross turnover fails to distinguish among entrants and exits resulting from mergers, court-ordered dissolutions, or normalr' growth or decline of companies. For example, if two firms on the top one hundred list in 1919 merged to form a new company, "turnover" would be increased (two exits, one entrant) yet economic power would have become more concentrated. Second, artificial distinctions among categories also create "turnover" where real industrial power continues: Cities Service Co. (now Citgo), although a large enterprise before 1954, was classified as a utility; in that year it disposed of its remaining domestic utility holdings, thus 4 All of the studies concerning "Big Business" take the size of the firm's assets as the means of determining "bigness." The choice of assets as basis for categorization represents an unfortunate but necessary compromise. Whether or not it is theoretically the appropriate variable, its measurement is sufficiently difficult to cause unease. The assets of a firm pass through a market-and hence are properly valued-only when the firm is actually sold. At all other points, the asset values must be estimated. In this respect, annual sales (on which the Fortune list is based), number of employees, or value added would provide a much more accurate measurement.
The "errors in variables" problem for assets can be simply illustrated. For extractive industries, a considerable part of each firm's assets consist of unmined minerals, oil, coal, etc. still in the ground. Not only is it difficult to measure the quantity of such stores, the value of those quantities obviously depends on such variables as the future costs of extracting them and future product prices. Thus none of the consequent estimates can be said to be based at all directly on market valuesthe only "true" test. A different form of the problem emerges most dramatically from the steel industry. Early estimates of the assets of U.S. Steel rely on the gross stock capitalization at its formation. Yet the merger of Carnegie Steel and several other firms to form U.S. Steel resulted in the new firm having stock worth, at face value, more than twice the combined assets of the merged companies. Some increase in the capitalized value of future earnings could legitimately be expected as a result of cost savings, increased monopoly power, and the like, and the larger value was what the J. P. Morgan promoters estimated the stock market would bear. The subsequent decline of the stock value indicated their mistake, but it does not help the historian attempting to calculate asset values.
It might be argued that the value of the firm can be estimated from the stock prices of publicly traded shares, which prices should reflect the present value of the discounted stream of expected future net earnings. Even if thishypothesis on stock price behavior is accepted, two considerations argue against its appcation: (1) for many firms early in the century, the shares were not publicly traded, so this method does not provide a general approach; and (2) for many frms whose shares were traded, large blocks of stock were held off the market by individual families (e.g., the Melons with Gulf stock), upwardly biasing the market price of those shares traded.
These methodological problems are not trivial, but the meagerness of historical data sources allows no alternative. Evidence for asset size, though scanty, inaccurate, and not always comparable, exists; evidence for other variables does not. Finally, focusing on industrials alone underemphasizes the extent of the consolidation of power achieved by the early twenties. The exclusion of public utilities, railroads, merchandising firms, banks, and insurance companies is particularly serious.
In order to minimize these problems, I adopt the following procedures when considering the data. First, I separate the "exits" by whether they are due to mergers, liquidations, or simple failures to grow. Second, no firm that appears on an earlier list will be excluded from a later list because it is "reclassified." Although excluding reclassified firms might be appropriate if the category "industrials" had a strict and economically meaningful boundary, which it does not, it is clearly unjustified in any attempt to understand the concentration of economic power. Third, I consider a newly-named company as simply a "successor" and not a new company if the assets of the acquired company constitute fifty percent or more of the "new" company. Fourth, I look beyond gross turnover; I not only consider the strict criterion of whether a firm in an earlier year (for example, 1919) has survived to the top one hundred in a later year (for example, 1969), but also the more sensible criterion of whether it survives as a large and powerful firm-for example, whether it has been able to maintain the real value of its assets in the later year. I also analyze the category of failures: those firms that go bankrupt, enter receivership, or fail to maintain their capital. Fifth, rather than casually choose a base, I hypothesize stages which justify the treatment of the 1890-1920 period as separate from the period which began in the early twenties. Finally, I analyze "industrials" separately so that my results can be compared directly with earlier work, but I also present some evidence for turnover among railroad, utility, merchandising, banking, and insurance companies as well.
The issue here resolves itself into two parts. First, was there (relatively) great change in the status of big industrial corporations between the turn-of-the-century merger movement and the end of the war and a constrastingly great (relative) stability between the early twenties and the present?8f While there still is no absolute cri-Edwards terion for "high" or 'low" stability, the comparison between periods, when adjusted to account for the difference between the lengths of the periods, provides one yardstick. Second, was the stability achieved by the early twenties generalized throughout the economy or restricted to a few sectors? INSTABILITY ( 1903 INSTABILITY ( -1919 vIMsus STABiLITY (1919 STABiLITY ( -1969 Data for the earlier period are sketchy and much less accurate than for the later period. John Moody, the major source for all these studies, did not begin publishing data on industrials until 1900, and understandably coverage during the early years was less than comprehensive. Nonetheless, the pattern seems pretty clear.
Data for the early period derive from several sources. Table IV Gross turnover is given in Table 1 . As indicated in column (4), the Table 3 gives the distribution of the failures listed in Table 2 . As shown in column (6), in the pre-1917 period few exits were caused by firms disappearing through mergers (nine to twenty percent), whereas in the post-1917 period most (sixty-four to seventy-eight percent) were due to this cause. Mergers may reflect either a firm's weakness (and hence susceptibility to takeover) or strength (attractiveness of its earnings to the acquiring firm) or simply consolidation (for example, merger of three or more firms where no firm provided at least half of the assets of the consolidated company). Thus the category of "mergers" represents exits of both strong and weak companies, and little can be concluded about whether they are "successful" or "unsuccessful" companies.
On the other hand, exits caused by "failure to grow" and 'liquidation" are unambiguous failures. As the last two columns show, firms failed far more frequently in the pre-1917 than in the post-1919 period-by at the least a factor of 8 (1.93/0.23).
Thus we can conclude, I believe, that the period from the 1898-1902 merger movement through the First World War was a period of relatively great instability compared to the post-war period. Moreover, the magnitudes themselves are important. In the earlier period, on the average two to four firms every year dropped below the minimum (constant dollar) assets of the smallest firm in the top one hundred in the base year. In the later period, it took approximately five years for one firm to drop out of the group. Table 4 Edwards industrial "giants." They were generally integrated firms which had significant national market power, they had extensive political influence, and they obtained access to outside capital through the major capital markets. On the other hand, the bottom one hundred or two hundred firms in Navin's list of five hundred can only be seen as medium-sized firms; they were largely local or regional firms, their market power was usually minimal, their stocks were not widely traded, and their political power was minimal except through groups like employer's associations or the National Association of Manufacturers. As a consequence, their fates were also quite dissimilar: while ninety-five of the top one hundred firms escaped liquidation, only seventy-four of the firms listed four hundred and one to five hundred (one hundred and sixty of those listed three hundred and one to five hundred) escaped liquidation. The differences are significant (chi-square test) at the .001 levels. The big firms survive; medium-sized (and presumably small) firms face relatively high odds of failure. the other big packing companies were forced to give up a mutually owned processing firm which had served as the agency for industry. wide collusion.
This unprecedented-and unrepeated-intervention by Federal agencies contributed to the uncertainty which surrounded the birth of big corporations. For example, U.S. Steel, when incorporated, controlled sixty-five percent of the steel market. For a time, it appeared that the government would define "unreasonable" restraint of trade as a situation which existed when, along with a number of other conditions, it could be shown that one firm controlled more than fifty percent of the market. U.S. Steel apparently decided to forego further consolidation, indeed even allow some erosion of its position, in order to escape anti-trust action.10 Big corporations did not find comfortable a situation in which the Anti-Trust Division could attack seven of the largest ten companies and actually force dismemberment of two.
COMPENSIVENESS OF TOH POST-WORLD WAR I CONSOLIDATION
Turning now to the character of the capitalist consolidation achieved by the early 1920's, I attempt to demonstrate two assertions. First, I argue that the consolidation was achieved across most of the industrial categories. Firms which would continue to dominate those industries had emerged in industries processing or manufacturing food, tobacco, lumber and paper products, chemicals, petroleum, rubber, metals of all sorts, farm and construction machinery, electrical machinery, communications equipment, motor vehicles, and photographic equipment. With few exceptions-new industries like airplanes and computers and a few old ones like furniture, textiles, and drugs-the industrial structure which continues at present was set by 1920.
Second, I attempt to show that the consolidation extended far beyond the usual category of "industrials' and in fact included transportation, utilities, insurance, banking, and to a lesser extent, merchandising. Firms in these areas that had achieved dominance by 1920-again with a few exceptions-continue to dominate today.
Appendix Table II had achieved a quite widespread and enduring consolidation of their positions by 1919. The industrial system which emerged out of this consolidation has been termed "monopoly capitalism"-a system in which the industrial center of the economy is dominated by large, oligopolistic, "eternal-life" corporations.13 The industrial structure might therefore be said to have passed through an earlier, unstable period and moved into the stable monopoly capitalist phase. For the remaining corporations, as the data reviewed above reveal, the risks of doing business in a 'competitive" economy were considerably reduced. It was on the foundation of this stable industrial structure that the latest phase, that of multinationalism, developed and is still unfolding. RICHARD 
